This paper combines insights from generation-one currency crisis models and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) to create a new generation-one type model. Fiscal solvency is the fundamental generating crises, as in generation-one models. The initial …xed-exchange-rate policy entails risks, both to its sustainability and to the real value of government debt. The risks are due to stochastic surplus shocks and an upper bound on the present value of surpluses. Stochastic surplus shocks, changes in expectations of future …scal commitments, and changes in the policy parameters can raise current desired debt or reduce expected future surpluses. Should the government's desired debt exceed the present-value of expected future surpluses, agents refuse to lend into this position of insolvency. The sudden stop of capital in ‡ows creates a crisis. Equilibrium can be restored with some combination of policy switching and debt devaluation to restore …scal solvency. The model can explain a wider variety of crises than generation one models, including those involving sovereign default. It is applied to explain crises in Argentina (2001), Mexico (1994, and Southeast Asia (1997), which did not …t the stylized facts of generation one models.
Introduction
The generation one model of exchange rate crises (Krugman 1979, Flood and Garber 1984) provided invaluable insights into the causes of exchange rate crises, o¤ering an explanation for Asia because these countries did not have government budget de…cits, and because Mexico sterilized the e¤ects of the speculative attack on its money supply.
These failures led researchers to modify the generation one model with speci…cs, which would allow it to explain particular crises, and to develop new generations of exchange rate crisis models. New generation models do not use …scal solvency as a fundamental determinant of crises. We argue that many exchange rate crises, including many of those which occurred in the 1990's, can be explained in a model which retains …scal insolvency as the fundamental generating the crisis. From a policy perspective, it important to understand the impact of policy on crisis risk.
We develop a "generation-one" type exchange rate crisis model which can explain a wider variety of crises than the original by using insights from both the original model and the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level" (FTPL). The model presented here is a conditional policyswitching model, as was the original, in which monetary policy switched from …xed exchange rates to ‡exible once …xed became infeasible. The initial policy mix in this model does not require government de…cits …nanced by declining reserves. Instead, it combines passive …scal policy and …xed exchange rates, supported by active monetary policy. 1 Under passive …scal policy the government surplus adjusts to past debt assuring intertemporal budget balance for any initial value of real debt. Temporary stochastic shocks to the primary surplus create permanent changes in debt, as in Barro's (1979) optimal tax-smoothing model, ultimately requiring adjustment in the primary surplus to service the debt. The stochastic shocks can originate in the private sector, as with a banking crisis which increases expected future government expenditures, or in the public sector with an unexpected change in taxes or spending. Shocks to both the current surplus and the expected present-value of future surpluses are possible.
In the absence of any additional constraints, this policy-mix is viable inde…nitely. However, a series of negative stochastic shocks could require very large values for future surpluses to service the debt, and every government faces limits on its abilities to raise taxes. These limits imply an upper bound on the present value of future surpluses, and equivalently on debt. When …scal policy is subject to stochastic shocks and an upper bound on debt, there is risk that the initial policy mix might not be inde…nitely viable. Therefore, the …rst significant departure from generation one models is replacement of the assumption of government 1 Leeper (1991) demonstrated that for equilibrium to exist, both monetary and …scal policy cannot be active.
spending …nanced by declining reserves and yielding inevitable crisis, with the assumption of a policy mix yielding crisis risk. 2 We show that any shock which creates su¢ cient deterioration in the current or expected future …scal position relative to the expected upper bound can create a crisis. The overall …scal position becomes the determinant of a crisis. A crisis need not be preceded by money…nanced government de…cits, since shocks which deteriorate expected future …scal positions or the upper bound can also create a crisis. We show that in equilibrium agents will not lend into a position for which they expect the government's intertemporal budget to be violated because they could not expect to receive the market rate of return. An endogenous sudden stop of capital ‡ows, which prevents the government from borrowing to continue its desired …scal policy, de…nes the crisis. The sudden stop of capital plays the role of the speculative attack on reserves in the generation one model and is an essential component of the …scal solvency model.
Since the crisis is caused by …scal insolvency, its resolution requires a policy response to restore solvency. In generation one models, solvency is achieved with increased seigniorage revenues, created by increased money growth. The second major departure from generation one models is that solvency can be restored through devaluation of nominal debt, created by currency depreciation. The model does not rule out an increase in seigniorage, but additional seigniorage is not necessary. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001 Rebelo ( , 2006 present evidence that debt devaluation played a larger role than increased seigniorage in restoring …scal solvency following many of the 1990's exchange rate crises. Although their model modi…es the original generation one model to allow an unexpected increase in future government expenditures to cause an exchange rate crisis, it retains the central role for seigniorage created by money growth in restoring …scal solvency. 3 We consider several types of policy responses. The …rst is a promise of …scal reform, with a switch to active …scal policy as in the literature on the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level"
(FTPL). With active …scal policy, monetary policy must be passive, requiring exchange rate ‡exibility. The switch creates larger near-term surpluses, which serve to raise the expected present-value surplus. If the present-value surplus is still too low relative to debt after the policy switch, exchange rate depreciation, reducing the real value of outstanding government debt, is necessary to restore …scal solvency. Since depreciation is possible, interest rates rise in anticipation of the crisis. Post-crisis seigniorage does not have to rise, and if the monetary authority's in ‡ation target does not change, then the monetary authority must sterilize the e¤ect of the speculative attack on the money supply.
Previous papers have shown that …scal policy switching from passive to active can create an exchange rate crisis. Sims (1997) considers a switching probability conditioned on outstanding government debt, and Daniel (2001b) analyzes an unexpected decrease in the present-value of future surpluses. Other policy-switching models include those of Davig and Leeper (2006) and Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007) , who consider the implications of stochastic policy-switching in a closed economy. This paper presents a dynamic model in which 3 The dynamics of crisis timing relies on particular assumptions about the time path of money growth. In the model presented here, money growth is not central.
policy-switching is neither a one-time unexpected event nor a stochastic event occurring without a crisis according to some, possibly conditional, probability. Instead, policy switching is one way that a government can choose to respond to a sudden stop in capital ‡ows. We …ll out the model with enough structure to obtain an equation for the evolution of government debt over time. This requires speci…cation of monetary and …scal policy as well as government budget constraints. We assume that the monetary authority has a price level target, …xing the exchange rate, and that the …scal authority follows a rule relating the current surplus to past debt. The rule is subject to stochastic shocks, giving …scal policy risk. The rule we choose is simple and does not require full speci…cation of a general equilibrium model. However, any rule with …scal risk could be used to complete the model. The government's ‡ow budget constraint, combined with the …scal rule, determines the expected behavior of debt over time. To keep the model simple, we set output growth to zero. 4 
Goods and Asset Markets
We assume that there is a single good in the world, implying that goods markets equilibrium requires the law of one price. Normalizing the world price level at unity and assuming no world in ‡ation implies yields an equilibrium price level in the small open economy equal to the exchange rate.
The …rst key assumption in the model is that international creditors are willing to buy and sell the small economy's government bonds as long as its interest rate, i t , satis…es interest rate parity. Interest rate parity can be derived as the Euler equation for a representative world agent when the covariance of the country's interest rate with world-agent consumption is zero, or when the world agent is risk neutral. Under the additional assumption that the world interest rate (i) is constant, interest rate parity can be expressed as
where E t denotes the expectation conditional on time t information, and S t denotes the exchange rate and equivalently the domestic price level. The interest rate can rise above the world interest rate when there is some possibility of an exchange rate crisis which will be resolved with depreciation. 5 
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to have a …xed exchange rate (price level) target. 6 When there is no possibility of a change in the exchange rate in the next period, interest rate parity, from equation (1), implies that the domestic interest rate equals the world rate.
Fiscal Policy 2.4.1 Government Flow Budget Constraint
The second key assumption is that government bonds are denominated in domestic currency. 7 This assumption is based on work by Jeanne and Guscina (2006), who show that even in emerging markets, a substantial fraction of government debt is denominated in domestic currency. Additionally, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001 Rebelo ( , 2006 show that in several crises in the 1990's, debt devaluation was a larger source of government revenue than money growth. 8 Letting G t and T t denote nominal government spending and tax revenue, respectively, the government's nominal ‡ow budget constraint is given by
6 We do not model the implementation of this target. It could be implemented in a model in which the monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate, controling expected in ‡ation. Control of the price level could then be achieved with an unstable policy rule, whereby the price level must jump to assure equilibrium. 7 We could allow some government bonds to be denominated in foreign currency with no substantive change to the analysis, as long as some bonds are denominated in domestic currency. Magnitudes would change with larger depreciation needed the smaller the fraction of domestic-currency debt in total debt. 8 Their papers retain the central role of an increase in money growth in restoring …scal solvency. In their model, the increase in money growth generates additional sources of …scal revenue, including debt devaluation.
De…ning real government debt (b t ) and the real primary surplus (s t ) as,
the government's ‡ow budget constraint can be expressed as
De…ning t as real debt devaluation due to currency depreciation,
and imposing interest rate parity from equation (1) yields
This reveals that interest-exclusive debt accumulates in response to expectations of depreciation which are not realized. Expectations of depreciation raise the interest rate, and when the depreciation does not occur, debt accumulates in response to the higher interest rate.
Optimization by the representative agent, together with the assumption that governments do not allow their debt to become negative in the limit, implies a government intertemporal budget constraint given by
9 First, substitute for t in equation (3) yielding
and substituting, the equation becomes (1 + i t 1 ) b t 1 E t 1 t = (1 + i) b t 1 : Solving for (1 + i t 1 ) b t 1 and substituting into the …rst equation above yields the expression in the text. 10 Woodford (1994) derives of the constraint as an equilibrium condition for a closed economy.
Note that surprise depreciation ( t E t 1 t > 0) is a source of government revenue.
Upper Bound
The third key assumption is that there is an upper bound on the present value of future primary surpluses, equivalently on the current value of debt. We motivate this assumption with the realization that taxes are distortionary such that there exists an upper bound on the present value of taxes that the government can collect. Since the primary surplus must service the debt in the long run, the upper bound on the value of debt implies an upper bound on the value for the surplus in the long run.
The upper bounds on the long-run values for debt and the surplus are related according
It is important to recognize that agents have no data which reveals the magnitude of this upper bound. Therefore, the upper bound is an expectational variable, subject to both political and economic shocks. We assume that changes in the expectation are rare and occur in response to a major political or economic event.
Fiscal Policy Rule
Fiscal policy is de…ned by the behavior of the primary surplus. We assume that the …scal authority is able to commit to a surplus rule, 11 in which the surplus responds to its own lag and a linear combination of a long-run target value for the primary surplus and debt service 11 The rule gives the government credibility, limiting the e¤ect of negative …scal shocks on the expected present value of future surpluses.
at the world interest rate. The surplus rule is given by
whereŝ is the long-run target value for the primary surplus, (1 a) measures persistence in the primary surplus, represents the responsiveness of the surplus to the value for debt service relative to its target value, and t is a bounded, stochastic disturbance representing …scal shocks ( t ). The lagged value of the primary surplus re ‡ects the desire to smooth the e¤ect of shocks over time and is consistent with empirical evidence showing persistence in the primary surplus. 13 Fiscal shocks ( t ) contain all determinants of the surplus not explicitly included in the surplus rule, many of which would be explicit if the model were placed in a full general equilibrium context. Changes in t represent changes in government spending and/or taxes in response to exogenous events like a war, natural disaster, or political change, as well as the optimal policy response to economic events like a business cycle. With this interpretation, policy authorities have some control over t : They control the response to shocks, but not the shocks themselves. We generally assume that the conditional mean of t is zero. However, we do consider a current shock to expected future surpluses, which has the interpretation of 12 Recognizing thatŝ = ib; the surplus rule can be written as
This shows that the surplus increases when the long-run target value is above the current value and when debt is above the long-run target value. 13 By treating the surplus as determined by equation (7), we are ignoring the e¤ect of capital gains or losses on seigniorage revenue it 1+it
Mt Pt under the assumption that the …scal authority can adjust the surplus to o¤set these. We are also assuming that the government chooses real expenditures and taxes. a non-zero mean for t on particular future dates.
Equations (7) and (4), yield dynamic equations for the surplus and debt
Letting represent eigenvalues, which are assumed to be real and distinct, the characteristic equation is given by
Much of the literature on the optimal …nancing of stochastic government spending, when taxes are distortionary, can be framed in terms of the value for : When = 1, one root is unity, and the other is (1 ) (1 + i) ; which is less than one under the assumptions in equation (7) . Under this parameterization, the model is stable around a long-run equilibrium which has a unit root. Fiscal policy looks very much like Barro's (1979) tax-smoothing model in which transitory disturbances ( t ) are optimally …nanced by a permanent increase in debt.
The increased debt is serviced by a permanent increase in taxes raising the primary surplus.
Permanent spending disturbances are immediately re ‡ected in taxes and have no e¤ect on the surplus. 14 Since debt is expected to reach a long-run equilibrium value, the government's intertemporal budget is balanced for any initial value of the price level. Therefore, a …scal rule given by (8) with = 1 is passive …scal policy.
Alternatively, when = 0; one eigenvalue is inside the unit circle, and the other is outside and equal to 1 + i. The model is saddlepath stable around a stationary long-run equilibrium.
There are values for initial debt and the surplus, such that the debt eventually rises at the rate of interest. Since such a path violates the government's intertemporal budget constraint, there must be a jumping variable, which keeps the system on the saddlepath toward a long- This paper is not designed to resolve the optimal tax issue, and we note that di¤erent governments choose di¤erent policies. A government which chooses …xed exchange rates cannot choose = 0; because …nancing stochastic expenditure with price and exchange rate jumps is inconsistent with …xed exchange rates. A government which wants …xed exchange rates could use Barro's tax smoothing model, setting = 1; as long as that policy implies that debt will remain below its long-run upper bound. If the government chooses this …scal rule, and stochastic shocks cumulate driving debt toward its upper bound, then the government must have plans to change policy. We assume that agents know these plans and use them to form expectations.
The fourth key assumption is that …scal policy entails risk. We assume that the government chooses to …x the exchange rate and follows a …scal rule with = 1: 16 Shocks to the surplus, together with the upper bound, imply that the initial policy mix might not be viable inde…nitely. We consider alternative assumptions about how the government plans to respond.
Stability and Dynamics in Equilibrium 2.5.1 Equilibrium with Initial Policy Mix
No Upper Bounds To facilitate understanding, consider equilibrium under the initial active …xed-exchange rate monetary policy ( t = E t 1 t = 0) and passive …scal policy ( = 1)
in the absence of upper bounds. Equilibrium under the initial policy mix in the absence of upper bounds is de…ned as:
Given constant values for the world interest rate and price level, together with a surplus rule from equation (8) with = 1 and a monetary policy …xing the exchange rate, an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the surplus, debt, and capital loss on debt, fb t ; s t ; t g 1 t=0 , such that the government's ‡ow and intertemporal budget constraints, given by equations (9) and (5), hold, expectations are rational, and world agents expect to receive the return on assets determined by interest rate parity, equation (1) .
Equations (8) and (9) with can be solved for the time paths for the surplus and debt as a function of initial values and the time path of shocks, ( t ; t E t 1 t ). Under passive …scal policy, the time paths for the surplus and debt are given by
where we have retained the shock t E t 1 t because it's value can be non-zero once upper bounds are introduced.
It is useful to represent the dynamics of the debt-surpus system using phase diagrams.
Substituting for the current surplus from equation (7) into equation (4) (7) yields
The phase diagram, with shocks at their expected values of zero, is given in Figure 1 . Either …scal shocks ( t ) ; expectations of depreciation (E t 1 t ) ; or surprise depreciation ( t E t 1 t ) move the system away from the s = b = 0 locus. Conditional on initial values, the system is always expected to reach a long-run equilibrium along the s = b = 0 locus with s t = ib t ; implying that the present-value of government debt is not expected to explode in the limit. This assures government intertemporal budget balance (5) for any value for t ; con…rming that the …scal rule given by equation (12) is passive:
Passive …scal policy permits active monetary policy to …x the exchange rate such that t = 0: Rational expectations assure E t 1 t = 0. When unexpected …scal shocks ( t ) move the system away from the s = b = 0 locus, say to point H, equations (12) and (13) can be used to show that the expected relationship between debt and surpluses along the adjustment path HF is given by
Note that when the conditional mean of future …scal shocks is zero, the slope of the adjustment path is constant, as drawn in Figure 1 . However, negative expected future …scal shocks e¤ectively increase the slope of the adjustment path in periods for which they are expected, implying higher expected long-run values for the debt and surplus for given initial values.
The expected long-run e¤ect of a shock on the debt and surplus can be determined by following the adjustment path, initialized by the current values of debt and the surplus, back to the s = b = 0 locus. Equivalently, the long-run e¤ects can be obtained from equations (10) and (11) by taking the expected limits for values for the surplus and debt as t ! 1.
Shocks have long-run e¤ects due to the unit root.
Equilibrium under the passive-…scal-policy, …xed-exchange rate regime is always possible, even though it might require very large values for the surplus in the long run. This is because the system is always expected to return to the s = b = 0 locus, implying that conditions for equilibrium, including the government's intertemporal budget constraint, are always satis…ed.
Upper Bounds Now, consider the implications of upper bounds for the dynamic behavior of the debt and surplus. We assume that the government maintains both its commitments to a …xed exchange rate and to the passive …scal rule until equilibrium under the initial policy mix is no longer feasible. A similar assumption in generation-one crisis models, that money-…nanced government spending continues until no longer possible, has been criticized as suboptimal. Rebelo and Vegh (2002) have shown that it is optimal to abandon the …xed exchange rate regime as soon as failure becomes inevitable. We demonstrate below that under the policy assumed in this model, a crisis occurs as soon as it becomes inevitable, satisfying the optimality criteria in Rebelo and Vegh (2002) . 17 Moreover, a country, which continues to follow the rule when crisis probability becomes positive, could receive favorable shocks and avoid the crisis. 18 An upper bound on debt implies that there is an upper bound adjustment path above which there is no passive-…scal policy active-monetary policy equilibrium. Consider a position for debt and the surplus above HF in Figure 1 . In the absence of an upper bound, the system would be expected to travel to a position along the s = b = 0 locus above F. However, when long-run debt has an upper bound of b; the long-run position implied by an initial position above HF is infeasible. Therefore, adjustment paths above HF cannot represent equilibrium paths and rational agents would not embark on such paths.
A crisis occurs when the passive-…scal-policy, …xed-exchange-rate equilibrium becomes impossible. This occurs when shocks and/or expectations send the system above an upper bound adjustment path. The visible symptom in markets is a sudden stop in capital ‡ows whereby agents refuse to lend as much as the government wants to borrow. To restore 17 Note that a permanent increase in government spending, …nanced initially by declining reserves (increasing debt) is not optimal in the Barro tax smoothing model. As argued by Rebelo and Vegh (2002) , the optimal response to the permanent increase in spending entails a zero surplus response. In this context the exchange rate must fail and seigniorage must increase immediately. 18 Announcing a stronger …scal rule, in the wake of negative …scal shocks which increase the current de…cit, is not likely to be credible.
equilibrium, thereby resolving the crisis, the real value of debt must fall and/or the expected present-value of surpluses must rise. To characterize the crisis as well as the dynamics leading up to a crisis in equilibrium, it is necessary to make assumptions about post-crisis policy.
Equilibrium under Active Fiscal and Passive Monetary Policy
We consider several post-crisis policy options. The …rst is a policy-switching response in which the …scal authority switches to active …scal policy and the monetary authority switches to passive policy as characterized by the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level." In this section, we characterize equilibrium under active …scal policy and passive monetary policy in the absence of upper bounds. The implications of upper bounds are discussed at the end of this section.
De…nition 2
Given constant values for the world interest rate and price level, together with a surplus rule from equation (8) with = 1 and a monetary policy setting i t = i, an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the surplus, debt, and capital loss on debt, fb t ; s t ; t g 1 t=0 , such that the government's ‡ow and intertemporal budget constraints, given by equations (9) and (5), hold, expectations are rational, and world agents expect to receive the return on assets determined by interest rate parity, equation (1) .
The dynamic model for the equilibrium values of real debt and the real surplus is given by equations (12) and (13) . One root is 1 + i and the other is 1 . This is a saddlepath stable model in which there are debt-surplus pairs for which the present-value of debt explodes in the limit, implying failure of the government's intertemporal budget constraint. To assure equilibrium, there must be one jumping variable to keep the system on the saddlepath. The monetary authority's interest rate target restricts E t 1 t = 0; but places no restrictions on t : Therefore, t jumps, implying jumps in b t from equation (4), to keep the system on the saddlepath. 19 Stochastic and symmetric 20 surprise appreciations and depreciations
( t E t 1 t ) ; …nance positive and negative stochastic surplus shocks. Since the system does not reach an equilibrium for arbitrary starting values, this is an active …scal rule. Under the assumption that the mean of t is zero for all t > n; the solutions for the surplus and real debt with active …scal policy are given by
Since the solutions contain only the stable root once t > n, there is no long-run e¤ect of shocks; the expected value of the surplus in…nitely far into the future is alwaysŝ:
When the mean of t = 0; these equations imply an equilibrium saddlepath relationship between debt and the surplus given by
The equations for the phase diagram can be computed by subtracting lagged values of the surplus and debt, respectively from equations (8) and (9) with = 0 to yield 19 The requirement that the coe¢ cient on the explosive root be zero implies:
20 In the active …scal policy regime with no possibility of policy switching, prices jump in response to …scal shocks to keep the surplus and debt on the saddlepath. With rational expectations, price surprises must be symmetric. See Daniel (2007) . 21 This requires jumps in t to keep the coe¢ cient on the unstable root equal to zero, yielding t = 1+i +i t :
The phase diagram is given in Figure 2 , and the saddlepath is labeled SP. The system travels along the saddlepath, labeled SP, to a long-run value for the surplus and debt at point F.
Shocks which send the system away from the saddlepath must be o¤set by price surprises, revaluing debt to keep the system on the saddlepath. shock requires additional revenue to assure intertemporal budget balance. Price surprises generate revenue, whereas anticipated price changes do not, implying that a price increase on the date that expenditures rise cannot generate the necessary revenue. Therefore, the price must jump on the date on which the future spending becomes anticipated. The jump reduces real debt such that on the date the government increases spending, the associated increase in debt and reduction in the surplus return the system to the original saddlepath.
Therefore, the increase in expected future government spending e¤ectively moves debt below the saddlepath on the date the future spending becomes anticipated, as in
The system then follows the arrows of motion with the unstable root, implying falling debt and an increasing surplus, until the date on which the spending increase occurs. After the anticipated shocks have been realized, the surplus falls and debt increases returning the system to the saddlepath relationship given by equation (17) . bound on the long-run target value for the primary surplus. The assumption in equation (7) thatŝ s assures that under the initial …xed exchange rate policy mix, the system is not in the neighborhood where reverse switching becomes possible.
Exchange Rate Crisis with Policy Switching
The previous section characterized equilibrium, …rst, under passive …scal policy and active monetary policy (Regime 1), and, second, under active …scal policy and passive monetary policy (Regime 2) in the absence of upper bounds. In both cases, we noted that upper bounds imply that the initial policy mix might not be viable inde…nitely. Therefore, in an equilibrium with upper bounds, agents must form rational expectations about how policy might change to assure equilibrium. In this section we consider an equilibrium in which policy is initially in Regime 1 with plans to switch to Regime 2 once equilibrium in Regime 1
is no longer feasible. The policy switching model can be viewed as a dynamic "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level" model of exchange rate crises. 22 To allow Regime 1 to be initially viable, but subject to risk, we assume that the initial values satisfy s t 1 < ib t 1 <ŝ: This implies that debt is rising, and that debt service is low enough to place the system below the saddlepath toŝ:
Equilibrium with Upper Bounds and Policy Switching
De…nition 3 Given constant values for the world interest rate and price level, an upper bound on the long-run value of debt, a policy mix, de…ned by a surplus rule from equation (8) with = 1 and a monetary policy …xing the exchange rate, which the government will maintain as long as possible, and plans for policy-switching in the event that the initial policy mix becomes infeasible, an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the surplus, debt, and capital loss on debt, fb t ; s t ; t g 1 t=0 , such that the government's ‡ow and intertemporal budget constraints, given by equations (9) and (5), hold, expectations are rational, debt does not exceed its upper bound in the long-run, and world agents expect to receive the return on assets determined by interest rate parity, equation (1) .
We de…ne a crisis as a period t = T in which there is no equilibrium under the initial …xed-exchange-rate, passive-…scal-policy mix. The symptom in markets is that agents refuse to lend at any interest rate.
Exchange Rate Depreciation and Expectations
To determine expectations of exchange rate depreciation leading up to a crisis, it is necessary to look forward to determinants of equilibrium on the crisis date. Equilibrium requires that the system begin on the saddlepath toŝ: For equilibrium conditions to be satis…ed under the post-crisis policy combination, t must be free to jump on the date of the crisis to place 22 Daniel (2001b) presents a …scal theory exchange rate crisis model in which an unanticipated shock causes the solvency crisis. Uribe(2006) presents a …scal theory model in which the role of devaluation is to eliminate hyperin ‡ation, not restore …scal solvency. Sims (1997) presents an FTPL switching model with switching and exchange rate crisis conditioned on the level of government debt, and Cochrane (2003 Cochrane ( , 2005 notes that the FTPL can explain a currency crisis. the system on the saddlepath associated with the …scal authority's target surplus, equation (17) . Additionally, equilibrium expectations of t must be rational.
To determine the probability of a crisis next period and one-period-ahead expectations of capital loss due to exchange rate depreciation, it is useful to compare the value of debt along the saddlepath to the long-run target surplus (ŝ) ; given by (17) , with the current value under passive policy, given by (13) . Using equations (17) and (13), this distance at time t can be expressed as
where t 1 is the state variable determining this vertical distance at time t and is given by
The state variable determining the time t distance is known at time t 1, and therefore receives a t 1 subscript. In equation (21) , the distance depends on the expectation of depreciation, on realizations of the surplus shock and depreciation, and on t 1 :
When faced with a crisis in which it cannot borrow the desired amount, the government announces a policy switch in which it sets = 0 in the …scal rule, e¤ectively replacing debt service with a long-run surplus target ofŝ s . Since the post-crisis debt-surplus system is saddlepath stable, the distance between the value of debt along the saddlepath toŝ and its current value must be zero in order for the the post-crisis system to approachŝ in the long run.
We de…ne a shadow value of depreciation, analogous to the shadow value of the exchange rate in generation one currency crisis models (Flood and Garber 1984) . The shadow value of depreciation represents the reduction in the value of debt needed for the economy to reach the saddlepath toŝ, equivalently to set t = 0. The shadow value can be positive or negative.
De…nition 4
The shadow value of capital loss on debt due to default at time t;~ t ; is de…ned as the value of t for which t = 0:
Setting t = 0 in equation (21) and solving yields
Using equations (4), (13), and (17), we can show that under the initial passive …scal policy with t = 0; t evolves as
Using equations (23) and (24), the state variable determining the distance at time t + 1 ( t )
can be expressed in terms of the shadow rate of depreciation at time t as
Since we have assumed that the system is in a region for whichŝ ib t > 0; the state variable determining the distance in period t+1 ( t ) could be negative even though the shadow rate of depreciation is negative today (~ t < 0) : This is because the passive-…scal-policy adjustment path is steeper than the saddlepath, so that, even in the absence of shocks and expected depreciation, debt rises relatively faster under passive …scal policy, than under active in the region for whichŝ ib t > 0.
We assume that the …scal authority never revalues in response to a crisis in which it cannot borrow. Instead, it chooses to reduce its post-crisis target surplus belowŝ in the event that borrowing constraints bind and~ t > 0: It is necessary to determine conditions under which borrowing constraints bind.
Assume that agents believe that the …scal borrowing constraint will bind, creating depreciation if~ t > 0: 23 We prove that this assumption is consistent with a rational expectations equlibrium below. This implies that the actual value for depreciation in the crisis period is given by
To solve for rational expectations of depreciation, de…ne a critical value for t , given by t ; as the minimum value for t which sets t = 0: Therefore, for t < t ; t > 0; and for t t ; t = 0: Letting f (v t ) be a bounded, symmetric, mean-zero distribution for t ;
with bounds given by , and using equations (23) and (26) , the expectation for t can be expressed as
A solution for E t 1 t exists if there is a solution for t : De…ning F ( t ) as the cumulative at t and collecting terms on the expectation yields
Substituting into equation (23), using equation (26), yields an expression for t as
Assume that the economy is in period t = T . To determine whether there exists an equilibrium expectation for one-period-ahead exchange rate depreciation E T T +1 ; it is necessary to determine whether there exists a solution for T +1 :
A solution for T +1 exists i¤ there exists a value for T +1 , satisfying
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium solution for T +1 when T < 0:
Proof. The proof requires showing that T +1 0 for all feasible values for T +1 : Let T +1 take on its smallest possible value of v, implying that T +1 = v < 0: The derivative of
with respect to T +1 is given by 1 F T +1 : For T +1 < v, this is positive. Therefore, as T +1 rises, T +1 rises monotonically. Once T +1 takes on its largest possible value, given by v, 1 F ( v) = 0, and T +1 takes on its maximum value of zero. Therefore, T +1 0 for all feasible values of T +1 : This implies that when T < 0; there is no feasible value for T +1 which sets T = 0 in equation (28) .
Intuitively, if the system were allowed to continue into period T + 1 with T < 0; then the probability of devaluation in period T + 1; conditional on information in period T; would be unity. Taking expectations of equation (26), using equation (23) when the probability of devaluation is unity, yields
This equation has a solution for the expectation only if T = 0: When T < 0; there can be no value for devaluation such that it equals its expectation minus a negative gap.
Lemma 2 When T = 0; the probability of a crisis with depreciation in period T + 1 is unity and E T T +1 1+i +i .
Proof. When T = 0; T +1 = 0; implying that T +1 = v: With T +1 equal to its upper bound, any realization of v T +1 requires devaluation, implying that the probability of devaluation is unity. Together, a unitary probability of devaluation and T = 0 imply that
T +1 , which must be greater than or equal to zero for any realization of T +1 , including its upper bound value of v. Therefore, E T T +1 1+i +i 0: With
; T +1 0 for any realization of T +1 :
Note that with T = 0 expectations of depreciation E T T +1 and actual depreciation T +1 can be arbitrarily large. However, when the government is following passive …scal policy and active monetary policy, the probability that shocks will occur, such that T takes on a value exactly equal to zero, is zero. Therefore, given passive …scal policy and active monetary policy …xing the exchange rate, a crisis with a unitary probability and arbitrarily high expectations of devaluation has probability zero.
Lemma 3 When T > 0; the probability of a crisis with devaluation in period T + 1 is less than one, and equation (27) has a well-de…ned solution for E T T +1 .
Proof. When T > 0; equation (28) implies that T +1 < 0; implying that T +1 < v:
Therefore, the probability of a crisis with devaluation, given by 1 F T +1 ; is less than one. Equation (27) can be solved for E T T +1 :
These three lemmas characterize feasible equlibrium positions under the initial policy mix, leading to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When T 0, the equilibrium interest rate in period T adjusts for rational expectations of depreciation E T T +1 0 ; and the government borrows its desired amount under passive …scal policy. When T < 0, there is no interest rate in period T which can compensate agents for expectations of depreciation, implying that there is no equilibrium under the initial policy mix.
Proof. For T = 0; Lemma 2 demonstrates that the probability of a crisis with depreciaiton is unity and provides a lower bound for the equilibrium expectation of depreciation. For T > 0, Lemma 3 demonstrates that the probability of a crisis with depreciation is less than one, and equation (27) can be used to solve for expected depreciation. For both cases, solutions for expected depreciation, together with equation (1) yield an equilibrium interest rate. For T < 0, Lemma 1 shows that there is no solution for expectations of depreciation.
Therefore, there is no value of the interest rate which can compensate agents for lending, implying that these positions cannot satisfy the de…nition of equilibrium.
Proposition 2 When T < 0, policy switching designed to set T = 0; restores equilibrium.
Proof. Policy switching restores equilibrium by setting T = 0, placing the system on the saddlepath to the long-run target value for the primary surplus. There are two cases to consider. When~ T < 0; devaluation with T =~ T ; sets T = 0: When T < 0; but~ T > 0; the government does not revalue. Instead, it chooses a target surplusŝ 0 <ŝ, such that the system is on the saddlepath to a lower target surplus without an exchange rate change. That is, it replacesŝ withŝ 0 in equation (22), substitutes this into equation (23) and solves forŝ 0 which sets the new expression for~ T = 0:
We can summarize the argument as follows. Agents believe that the government will switch policies and allow the currency to depreciate as necessary when it cannot borrow the amount needed to continue passive …scal policy. Agents refuse to lend when there is no value for the interest rate, based on the expected value for depreciation, which can compensate then for expectations of capital loss on debt. Policy switching is the response to the inability to borrow, validating agents beliefs that the government will switch policies and allow nonnegative depreciation when it cannot borrow.
De…nition 5 Conditional on the expectation that a lending crisis will be resolved with policy switching to keep expected values for future debt from rising aboveŝ i s i
; a boundary path for debt service (ib) is given by the saddlepath leading toŝ:
Note that the boundary path is de…ned with respect to the government's desired long-run values for the surplus and debt, not by their upper bounds. Equation (21) shows that for t = t = E t 1 t = 0; a positive value for t 1 implies that the current value of debt, b t ; is below the boundary locus. However, …scal shocks ( t ), expectations of default (E t 1 t ), and default ( t ) can all a¤ect the position of b t relative to the boundary locus.
Phase diagrams are useful to understand how such a crisis could arise. Figure 3 superimposes the s = 0 curve and the saddlepath for the active-…scal-policy system on the phase diagram for the passive-…scal-policy system. Consider the dynamics leading up to a crisis, using the phase diagram in Figure 3 , when the only shocks are current …scal surplus shocks. When the system is far below SP, say at point A with t 1 > ; then no shock could send the system above SP, and the arrows of motion for the passive-…scal-policy system govern. Consider the feasibility of a position like C. Point C is feasible because the expectation of a regime switch in the future raises the expected present-value surplus to equal the value of outstanding debt. As the system approaches the saddlepath so that t 1 < , the market begins to anticipate depreciation, given by equation (27) . This anticipation forces the interest rate to increase to incorporate the increase in expected in ‡ation from equation (1) . The monetary authority allows the interest rate to rise to keep the current exchange rate …xed. Therefore, debt is expected to increase more quickly than implied by the locus CD, reaching SP at a point like E.
A crisis occurs when agents refuse to lend, and there are two ways in which this can happen. Conditional on T 1 > 0; a surplus shock smaller than the cricital value could send the system above the saddlepath in period T such that T < 0 and~ T < 0. Such a position cannot represent an equilibrium, and regime switching with depreciation brings the system to the saddlepath. 24 Alternatively, the dynamics of the surplus and debt under passive policy could imply that debt next period in the absence of the regime switch would travel above the saddlepath such that T < 0; but~ T > 0. Agents will not lend into this position since no rationally-expected value for the future depreciation could place the system on a stable path. A regime-switch allows debt and the surplus to move along a saddlepath below SP, implying a long-run surplus belowŝ: When a sudden stop occurs with debt below the saddlepath, there is no depreciation. After the regime switch, capital gains and losses on debt due to exchange rate changes are symmetric, implying that expectations of in ‡ation and exchange rate change are again zero.
Corollary 1 A government which wants to sustain current …scal policy as long as possible chooses the largest feasible target value for the long-run surplus.
Proof. By Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, the probability of a crisis is determined by the boundary locus. The position of the boundary locus is determined byŝ; and the boundary locus is higher the larger isŝ:
Shocks Other Than Current Fiscal Shocks
Any shock which changes the position of the post-crisis equilibrium value of debt a¤ects the value of T : Therefore, these shocks can cause a crisis or increase the probability of one.
Again assume that the economy in Regime 1 is in the range for which s T < ib T <ŝ:
Expected future …scal shocks An increase in expected future government spending reduces the post-crisis equilibrium value of debt according to equation (20) . This reduces the value of T :
Changes in the parameters of the surplus rule A reduction in the expected long-run target value of the surplus shifts the saddlepath down, reducing T for any given value of debt. A change in the policy parameters in the …scal rule, for example a reduction in the responsiveness of government spending to debt (reduction in ) increases the slope of the saddlepath without increasing long-run equilibrium values, directly reducing T .
Alternative Policy Responses to a Crisis
Policy-switching is only one possible response to a crisis that policy makers might choose.
In this section, we brie ‡y consider others.
Devalue and Repeg at a Lower Rate
The government could also devalue and repeg the exchange rate at a lower value to reach the adjustment path toward its target surplus without any …scal policy change. In this case monetary policy must allow the interest rate to be determined by expectations of devaluation to satisfy interest rate parity, equation (1), defending the …xed exchange rate. Let t 1 be rede…ned as the state variable determining the distance between the target value for debt, given byŝ=i; and the current expectation of its long-run value under passive …scal policy from equation (11) . 25 This policy implies the second proposition.
Proposition 3 A policy in which the government devalues to place the system on the adjustment path towardŝ and repegs at the lower rate without …scal reform will fail next period with probability one.
Proof. After devaluation to place the system on the desired adjustment path, T = 0; and the probability of devaluation next period is unity by Lemma 2. Expectations of devaluation E T T +1 are at least as high as , implying high interest rates. 26 With probability one, the …xed rate fails in the subsequent period with a devaluation and in every period thereafter.
Post-crisis equilibrium is characterized by repeated exchange rate depreciation which can be arbitrarily large in magnitude. Expectations of depreciation must be large enough that depreciation occurs for any …scal shock. This is because the government is assumed never to revalue to reach its target adjustment path. Expectations of depreciation must be correct on average, implying that expectations of depreciation must be the average value of depreciation. Therefore, following the crisis, markets remain turbulent. Agents expect additional depreciation, interest rates are high, and additional depreciation is necessary.
Given sustained post-crisis turbulence, it would be di¢ cult to make a case that this policy represents optimal response.
s and the distance is given by t =
: For a derivation, see Daniel (2007) . 26 The shadow rate of devaluation is given by~ t = E t 1 t
Default
The government could plan to respond to a crisis by reneging on its no-default commitment.
Both default and devaluation reduce the real value of outstanding debt moving the, system toward theŝ saddlepath. The larger the default, the smaller the devaluation and vice versa. However, given that default typically takes time to resolve and given that agents usually do not know the magnitude of default, expectations about the magnitude could be volatile, implying a volatile exchange rate until a value for default is …nalized. Since default solves the same …scal solvency problem as devaluation, default and devaluation can occur together. 27 
IMF Loan
Assume that the country plans to resolve the crisis by securing an IMF loan to replace the private market source of loans it looses in a crisis. To simplify the presentation and contrast this policy with those preceding it, we assume there is no accompanying debt devaluation either through depreciation or default. An IMF loan with debt devaluation would be analyzed as a combination of the two policy responses.
The IMF is willing to make the loan when the private market is not because the IMF can force …scal policy change as a condition for receiving the loan. IMF programs for countries with …scal problems usually require an increase in the value of the government surplus for a speci…c period of time. We model this as an increase in the mean of t for a speci…c period of time. In Figure 1 , this ‡attens the adjustment path, leading to a lower expected value for the long-run surplus, restoring …scal solvency. E¤ectively, the government's intertemporal budget constraint is restored because the present value of future surpluses rises, not because the real value of debt falls. With this policy, expectations of depreciation are always zero.
Model Applied to Recent Currency Crises
In this section we illustrate the implications of the …scal solvency model for several recent currency crises not explained well by the standard generation one model. Fiscal solvency remains essential in the explanation but future seigniorage is not. Crises are caused by current …scal shocks combined with loss of con…dence in the …scal rule, expected future …scal shocks, and a policy of devaluation and repegging without policy switching, leading to expectations of further devaluation.
Argentina 2001: Current Fiscal Shocks and Loss of Con…dence
The …rst crisis we consider is the Argentine crisis in 2001. This crisis cannot be explained by a generation one model since the currency board prevented money-…nanced government de…cits and made a total run on reserves impossible. Yet, government de…cits and rising government debt did precede the crisis, and the crisis was characterized by both currency depreciation and sovereign default, highlighting the role of …scal problems. Simulations of the …scal solvency model imply that the Argentine crisis was caused by a combination of a negative …scal shocks stemming from the 1998 recession, a reduced surplus-response to government debt ( ), and a crisis of con…dence reducing the expectations for the governments long-run target value for the primary surplus (ŝ) :
For the simulations, we assume that the values for the surplus and debt in the model represent ratios to GDP, implying that the interest rate variable is the growth-adjusted real interest rate. We assume that the growth-adjusted real interest rate is .02, based on real interest rates of about 5-6% and reasonable expected growth rates of 3-4%. We let the upper bound on the target surplus be 1.5% of GDP, larger than any surplus achieved in the 1990's, for the consolidated public sector, including federal and provincial governments, as a fraction of GDP from 1991-1998, we estimate a value for of .60 28 , and argue that this strong …scal stance is consistent with initial policy.
In 1991, the value of debt was 38:5% of GDP, while the surplus was :5%: We use a uniform distribution to generate surplus shocks and let bounds on the distribution be 2% of GDP since surplus shocks this large were observed. We use 5,000 simulations to calculate the probability of a crisis in twenty years. If we assume that a crisis would be resolved with a switch to active …scal policy and passive monetary policy, then the initial position of Argentina in 1991 was well below the upper bound path, given by the saddlepath leading to a surplus of 1.5% of GDP. Given these parameter values, simulations show that the stabilization program initiated by Argentina was very safe with the probability of a crisis in twenty years almost zero.
The 1998 recession brought large …scal de…cits, and debt increased to 50.9% of GDP by the end of 2000. However, simulations with the higher debt and the surplus at its 2000 value of -.1% show that the increase in debt alone would not have increased the probability of a crisis, had Argentina maintained its strong …scal stance. With the same …scal rule and the same upper bound on the surplus, simulations show that the probability of a crisis in ten years remains close to zero. Therefore, according to the model, the increase in debt due to negative …scal shocks alone cannot explain the crisis.
It is reasonable to argue that the 1998 recession weakened both the …scal stance as well as con…dence in …scal policy. Large …scal de…cits are consistent with both a string of negative …scal shocks and a change in the …scal rule whereby surpluses become more persistent and less responsive to debt as falls. Fiscal policy from 1998-2001 is more consistent with a value of =.17. 29 Additionally, a crisis of con…dence could have lowered the public's expectation of upper bound on the surplus which the government could sustain, so we assume that the upper bound falls from 1.5% to 1.25% implying a fall in the upper bound on debt to 62.5%. With the weaker …scal stance and reduced con…dence, the probability of a crisis in ten years increases to 77% with the mean time to a crisis being two years. Therefore, the model with a reduction in the surplus-responsiveness of debt and a lower upper bound on 29 This is the regression estimate for using four years of data from 1998-2001. the surplus predicts the crisis which occurred. The crisis did not occur immediately with the 1998 recession because there was still some possibility that it could be avoided.
The simulations imply that reduced responsiveness of …scal policy to debt was key to generating the crisis. Had the initial 1991 stabilization program been accompanied by the weaker …scal stance we assumed occurred with the 1998 recession, then simulations show that the program would have been much less safe with crisis probability over the next twenty years rising to 35% with mean time to a crisis being about ten years. This illustrates the importance of the strong …scal stance, represented by a large response of the surplus to debt, for the viability of the initial stabilization program. Therefore, the model implies that the initial monetary and …scal reform in 1991 in Argentina was sound. If Argentina had maintained a …scal rule like that it initiated in the beginning of the reform, then it would have likely avoided the crisis. The recession brought not only negative surplus shocks, but also a weakened …scal rule and reduced con…dence in …scal policy, substantially raising the probability of a crisis.
Mexico 1994-95: Devaluation and Repeg without Policy Switching
The Mexican crisis was not preceded by money-…nanced government de…cits (Calvo and Mendoza 1996, Cole and Kehoe, 1996) . Instead, primary surpluses had exceeded 1% of GDP since 1983, and debt as a fraction of GDP was falling. At the end of 1993, debt was 25.3% of GDP. 30 Mexico was at a point like G in Figure 1 , moving toward a target surplus well below its upper bound. The country was not experiencing …scal solvency problems in any standard sense and cannot be explained by a generation one model. The …scal solvency model can explain Mexico's crisis if we assume that the surprise 15% devaluation of the peso relative to the US dollar in December 1994 was a signal that the government planned to respond to shocks, which moved it away from its desired adjustment path, with devaluation, but not with revaluation or …scal reform.
Under this assumption, the devaluation set T = 0: Since the distance to the desired adjustment path was zero after the devaluation, and only devaluation would be used to o¤set future …scal shocks, expected future devaluation could be arbitrarily high from Lemma A policy to restore con…dence and change the perception that the government would use future debt devaluation to achieve …scal goals was necessary to end the crisis. It is reasonable to argue that the large US loan illustrated US con…dence in the government, restoring private con…dence, thereby strengthening expectations about …scal rule parameters, possibly by raisingŝ and/or , and increasing T . Under the assumption that the government will respond to a crisis with policy switching, the increase in expected future spending lowers the maximum value of current debt consistent with the …xed exchange rate policy mix and the current value for the surplus. Equivalently, we could capitalize the present value of expected future spending into a current value, add this to debt, and compare the sum to the old upper bound path for debt. A crisis occurs as soon as agents refuse to lend because they believe that the government's desire to borrow would place it above the path toward its upper bound.
Southeast
Consider Thailand, where the crisis …rst erupted. Primary surpluses and strong GDP growth had reduced total government debt from a peak in 1986 of 36.5% of GDP to only 3.8% by the end of 1996. 31 In Figure 1 , Thailand was at a point like G. However, in 1996 the country entered a recession, and reductions in land and stock market values created a …nancial sector crisis. BER (2001) present estimates of the costs of recapitalizating the banking sector of 30 to 35% of GDP. Capitalizing this into current debt implies that the country's e¤ective debt/GDP was similar to that in 1986. Its surplus/GDP was larger at .9% of GDP in 1996 compared to -3% in 1986. Even though the recession could have implied expected near-term negative surplus shocks, it is di¢ cult to argue that if the government was expected to follow the same …scal rule it had followed earlier, that agents would have believed that it was near …scal insolvency in 1996, when it was clearly solvent in 1986.
The di¤erence between the two periods lies in the …nancial sector crisis and political uncertainty over the …scal implications of its resolution. The political uncertainty could have caused agents to believe either that the government could not maintain its strong …scal rule or that its upper-bound surplus was smaller, both reducing the value for debt along the upper-bound path. This reduction could have contributed to the perception that government borrowing would place debt on an unsustainable path. The exchange rate remained volatile in subsequent months, with gains and losses, but with losses dominating, until the government had determined how to handle the banking crisis. Volatile exchange rates are consistent with volatile expectations about the present-value of future surpluses under active …scal policy.
Korea also faced a banking crisis with estimates of the cost of restructuring the banking system at 24-30% of GDP (BER 2001) . Also similar to Thailand, the country had experienced primary government surpluses for four years and debt was only 7.5% of GDP at the end of 31 Data is from IFS.
1996. However, if future liabilities are capitalized into current debt, then debt/GDP was almost twice as large as its largest value since 1980 (17% of GDP in 1982) and well above its mean value of 12% since 1980. 32 Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that agents believed that Korea faced a …scal solvency problem. Additionally, concern over the …scal response to the banking crisis could have led agents to believe that the government would adopt a weaker …scal stance, further increasing the probability of a crisis.
Other Crises
These crises are meant to illustrate the major types of shocks which can cause …scal …nancial crises, including current …scal shocks, expected future …scal shocks, loss of con…dence in current …scal policy which reduces the expected value of future …scal surpluses, and devaluation to respond to a current shock with implicit promises to use additional devaluation to respond to future shocks. We could use the model to analyze many other actual crises.
At the time of this paper's writing, Iceland is experiencing a crisis in which the estimated future government expenditures necessary to recapitalize the banking system are something like 80% of GDP. The country has experienced a sudden stop of capital ‡ows, its currency has depreciated sharply, and it is negotiating for an IMF loan. Equilibrium in the sense of the model has not yet been restored as private capital is not ‡owing at any interest rate, implying that markets believe the government remains in an insolvent position. 32 Data are from IFS.
Conclusions
This paper provides a dynamic model of currency crises which retains …scal solvency as the central cause, as in generation one models. However, it replaces the initial inconsistent policy mix of the generation one model with a policy mix which fails with positive probability. And it replaces the role of seigniorage in restoring …scal solvency with debt devaluation, created by currency depreciation. The model is the product of insights from the original generation one model, which highlights …scal solvency as a key fundamental in exchange rate crises, and the FTPL, which allows capital gains and losses on debt to maintain …scal solvency.
When stochastic shocks move the government's desired debt above the path leading to the long-run upper bound, agents refuse to lend, precipitating a crisis. The crisis could be caused by current …scal shocks, which raise desired debt and reduce the current surplus, by expectations of new future …scal commitments which raise the expected present-value of future surpluses, or by a change in the current …scal rule or the expectation of such a change. Agents will not lend and equilibrium cannot be restored until policy responds to restore expectations of …scal solvency. One possibility is a regime switch, in which the …scal rule becomes active and monetary policy becomes passive, as in the FTPL. This allows future price level (and exchange rate) surprises to o¤set stochastic surplus shocks and usually requires exchange rate depreciation in the crisis period to reduce the outstanding value of debt. A policy of devaluation to restore …scal solvency without a change in the …scal rule will restore equilibrium, but at the cost of arbitrarily high expected future devaluation and interest rates. Cumulative exchange rate depreciation is lower the sooner …scal reform is implemented. This result highlights the importance of …scal reform in restoring orderly markets after a crisis. Since currency depreciation and sovereign default both restore …scal solvency, they can occur together.
We apply the model to explain crises in Argentina ( by allowing policy switching to be the endogenous response to a crisis, which resolves the crisis by restoring …scal solvency. It highlights the danger of using devaluation without …scal reform to restore solvency. More generally, the model provides additional support for viewing …scal policy as a key determinant of exchange rate crises.
